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AUTHORS AS "LICENSORS" OF "INFORMATIONAL
RIGHTS" UNDER U.C.C. ARTICLE 2B
By Jane C Ginsburg t
ABSTRACT
U.C.C. Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code was de-
signed primarily to regulate online and mass market transactions, par-
ticularly the licensing of computer software. Its effects, however, will
extend to authors of works other than computer software. This Article
considers the effects Article 2B would have on dealings between those
authors and the exploiters of the authors' works. By reducing procedural
barriers to the formation of licenses, Article 2B would make it all too
easy for an author to assent to contract terms that may heavily favor an
exploiter of the author's work. On the other hand, default contract terms
contained in Article 2B would provide substantive protections to authors
who enter into informal licenses. Authors and their representatives, who
have not closely followed the evolution of Article 2B, would do well to
contribute their perspectives to the drafting process.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 946
II. DOES ARTICLE 2B APPLY TO AUTHOR-EXPLOITER CONTRACTS? .......................... 947
Ill. WHAT AUTHOR-RELEVANT MANDATORY OR DEFAULT RULES DOES ARTICLE
2B SET FORTH, AND How WOULD THEY APPLY? .................................................. 953
A. Default Rules that May Enhance Authors' Control Over Their Works ........ 954
1. Copyright Licenses Whose Value Exceed $5,000 and Which Endure
for One Year or M ore ............................................................................ 955
2. Substantive Limitations on the Licensee's Rights .................................. 959
B. Rules that Increase Authors' Vulnerability to Exploiters .............................. 965
1. Two Test C ases ..................................................................................... 970
IV. SHOULD ARTICLE 2B COVER INDIVIDUAL AUTHOR-EXPLOITER CONTRACTS? ...... 973
© 1998 Jane C. Ginsburg.
t Morton L. Janklow, Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law. Thanks to Professor Jessica Litman, to Jacqueline Ewenstein,
J.D. Columbia Law School class of 1998, and to Andrew Thompson, Columbia Law
School class of 1999.
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
First, a fact proposition: like computer programs, most, if not all,
copyrighted works may today be expressed in Is and Os. Second, a warn-
ing to resist the looming syllogism: if all works can be expressed in Is and
Os, that does not make all copyrighted works computer programs. Some
have suggested that proposed Article 2B of the U.C.C., having started with
software, but then extended its reach to "the copyright industries" gener-
ally,' has sunk into that syllogism, and, as a result, may disserve authors,
publishers, and other participants in the exploitation and use of copy-
righted works other than software.2 One may wonder whether a commer-
cial code conceived primarily to regulate online and mass market transac-
tions, particularly with respect to information "deliverables" 3 appropri-
ately or sensibly extends to individual authors' grants of incorporeal rights
under copyright.
My task is to consider how authors of works other than software fare
under the current (August 1998) draft of Article 2B. Do the proposals
make a difference to individual authors' dealings with publish-
ers/exploiters? To what extent does Article 2B enhance authors' ability to
control the exploitation of their works? To what extent does Article 2B
increase authors' vulnerability toward their exploiter/co-contractants? In
responding to these questions, Part II inquires whether Article 2B applies
to author/exploiter contracts. Part III identifies author-relevant provisions
of Article 2B, and their implications. Part IV considers whether Article 2B
should apply, in light of its impact on authors' contracts.
Aside from Article 2B's effect on contracts between authors and the
exploiters of their work, Article 2B presents other issues of concern to
authors, particularly to authors who self-publish, as perhaps more and
1. See, e.g., U.C.C. Article 2B, Preface at 5 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft); id. § 2B-103,
Reporter's Note 1; id § 2B-102(aX26) and accompanying Reporter's Note 23 (defining
informational content and distinguishing "information" not meant to be perceived by hu-
man beings from "informational content" that is meant so to be perceived; a database of
images offers informational content with respect to the images, and information with re-
spect to the computer program that makes the images accessible).
2. See, e.g., Letter from Allan Adler, Association of American Publishers, to Arti-
cle 2B Drafting Committee (Feb. 17, 1997), available at <http://www.2Bguide.com/
docs/aap.html> (visited Mar. 30, 1998); Letter from Gary L. Griswold, American Intel-
lectual Property Law Association, to Article 2B Drafting Committee (Nov. 18, 1997),
available at <http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/sycaipla.html#aipla> (visited Nov. 23,
1998).
3. See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen Y. Chow on Avoiding Confusion of In-
formation and Intellectual Property Rights (Feb. 12, 1998), available at
<http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/chowip.pdf> (visited Nov. 23, 1998).
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more authors will do on the Internet. These issues, however, I believe, are
not specific to authors as creators of copyrighted works; they are relevant
to disseminators of copyrighted works, be they the. works' authors, their
publishers, or third-party authorized distributors. Thus', this discussion will
not address the impact of Article 2B on the relationship of disseminators
of works of authorship and the consuming public. Other contributors will
take up that issue, and related controversies.
With respect to the issues that I do cover, I conclude that Article 2B
can be both good and bad for authors, depending on the level of detail that
informs their agreements. Article 2B can offer some valuable safeguards
to authors whose dealings with exploiters are so informal that its default
rules would fill in the substance of their agreements. On the other hand,
Article 2B's provisions governing the formation of enforceable agree-
merits can be detrimental to authors who may end up assenting all too eas-
ily to detailed exploiter-written grants. This leaves me ambivalent about
the inclusion of non-software authors within Article 2B's coverage. If
these authors are to remain subject to Article 2B, then Article 2B's draft-
ers should consider adopting further substantive and procedural protec-
tions. The conclusion of this Article offers some proposals for improve-
ment of the "fit" between Article 2B and the copyright interests of indi-
vidual authors.
II. DOES ARTICLE 2B APPLY TO AUTHOR-EXPLOITER
CONTRACTS?
While Article 2B purports to apply to "the copyright industries," I
think it is fair to observe that the copyright law's perspective does not per-
vade Article 2B's text or notes. Article 2B governs "licenses," 5 and a li-
cense is defined as "a contract that authorizes access to or use of informa-
tion or of informational rights .... ,,6 "Informational rights" are defined to
"include all rights in information created under laws governing ... copy-
rights ....",, Finally, "information" means "... works of authorship ...
4. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Federal
Law and Policy ofIntellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REv.. 1.13, 128-31 (forth-
ercoming 1999); David F. McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article
2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy Information Transactions, and
"Aggressive Neutrality," 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998).
5. U.C.C. § 2B-103(a)(1) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft); id. at Reporter's Note 1.
6. Id. § 2B-102(a)(28).
7. Id. § 2B-102(a)(27).
8. Id. § 2B-102(a)(24).
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From a copyright perspective, Article 2B's nomenclature is anomalous,
since copyright does not protect "information;" it protects the "expres-
sion" of ideas and facts. 9 Similarly, copyright owners do not license "use"
of their works, they grant rights "to do and to authorize" acts enumerated
in the statute.' 0 Moreover, while copyright addresses incorporeal rights,
rather than physical objects," Article 2B's terminology better fits transac-
tions in copies than in copyrights. Despite the breadth of its reach, Article
2B's text seems primarily preoccupied with transfers of copies of soft-
ware: grants of intellectual property rights are most relevant to the extent
that copyright (or other) permission is necessary to allow the transferee to
enjoy the copy.' 2
That said, Article 2B's literal coverage of rights in works of authorship
beyond software is not inadvertent. 13 The rationale for broad-based cover-
age relies on the impending "convergence" of modes of communicating
and delivering all kinds of copyrighted works.' 4 That is, if any kind of
copyrighted work can be expressed in I s and Os, and thus can be the object
of an electronic transaction, then transactions in all copyrighted works re-
quire uniform treatment, even if particular works are not in fact in digital
form. Suppose, for example, that I license both a digital compilation of
text or graphics and the search program that accompanies it. The program
comes within the core subject matter of Article 2B; arguably, it does not
make sense for one contract regime to govern the program, and another
the compilation. Once software-appurtenant digital works are covered, one
9. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 1998); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
10. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1998). See also Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer Generated Works, 47 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1185, 1219 (1986)
("Concerning an exclusive use right, the copyright law differs from the patent law, which
does give the owner of the intellectual property interest an exclusive right to use (or
authorize use of) the protected work."). Samuelson cites the statement of Dorothy
Schrader, general counsel of the U.S. Copyright Office, Hearings on S. 1201 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyright and Trademark of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1983). Id at 1219 n.141 ("[T]he new use right ... is a right that,
as far as we are aware, has absolutely no equivalent in copyright law .... "). Cf 35
U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 1998) (defining patent infringement: as "whoever without author-
ity makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention ...") (emphasis added).
i1. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 202 (West 1998) (distinguishing ownership of copyright
from ownership of physical object).
12. See Chow, supra note 3 (distinguishing "information deliverables" from incor-
poreal copyright).
13. See U.C.C. Article 2B, Preface at 4 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
14. See, e.g., id § 2B-103, id at Reporter's Note 1; Joseph Verdon, Article 2B:
Transactions in Software and 'Information', N.Y. L.J., Aug. 13, 1997, at i.
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may as well cover other digitally expressed works, since these are destined
for digital distribution, and Article 2B particularly targets online "access
contracts."' 15 Once digitally expressed works are covered, it may not make
sense to make the contract regime turn on media discrimination, with Arti-
cle 2B reaching transfers of rights in works in digital form, but common
law contract rules governing transfers of rights in the same work when it is
in analog form.
Thus, given Article 2B's definition of "information" as including
"works of authorship,"' 6 it would at first appear that Article 2B covers all
authors who grant rights in copyrighted works. In fact, however, the cur-
rent draft of Article 2B specifies significant exclusions from its scope. As
a result, Article 2B's coverage of authors and their. works is neither com-
prehensive nor predictable. For example, section 2B- 104(5) excludes "a
contract for personal or entertainment services by an individual or group."
By "personal services," Article 2B appears to mean employment contracts
generally.17 If so, then Article 2B would exclude employee-creators of
works made for hire, but these creators are not considered "authors" under
the Copyright Act in any event. 
18
What counts as performance of "entertainment services?" Article 2B
does not define the term. The concept would appear to exclude from Arti-
cle 2B's scope contracts for live performances, for example, by musicians
or actors. What about agreements to record a performance of a musical
composition or dramatic work? Earlier drafts of Article 2B would have
included these, because the production of a sound recording would have
transferred the performers' informational rights. 19 By contrast, had the re-
cording occurred at the live concert, Article 2B would have covered the
recording agreement, but not the agreement to render the entertainment
services of performing at the live event at which the recording was made.
15. U.C.C. § 2B-103(a)(1) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft); id at Reporter's Note 2b.
16. Id. § 2B-102(a)(24).
17. See id. § 2B-104(5), id Reporter's Note 6 ("Subsection (5) deals with services
contracts."). The exclusion was clearer in the February draft. See U.C.C. § 2B-103(c)(4)
(Feb. 1998 Draft) (excluding a "contract of employment of an individual other than as an
independent contractor .... ").
18. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(b) (West 1998). In addition, unreserved transfers of all
rights under copyright are not within 2B's scope. See U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(28) (Aug. 1,
1998 Draft). This would also exclude work for hire contracts. See discussion infra Part 11.
19. The production of the sound recording requires a license from the performers of
their rights under 17 U.S.C.A. § I 101 to authorize the fixation of their musical perform-
ance. The commercialization of the sound recording requires a license or assignment of
the performers' reproduction and distribution rights in their fixed performances.
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The August draft excludes contracts both for live and for recorded per-
formances, not only with respect to sound recordings, but, more signifi-
cantly, with respect to motion pictures. Section 2B- 104(8) excludes
a license of a linear motion picture or sound recording or of in-
formation to be included therein, except in connection with pro-
viding access to such motion picture or sound recording under an
access contract covered by this article. 20
The current proposal thus removes from Article 2B's scope a broad
class of contracts transferring rights to include works of authorship 2' in
"linear motion picture[s]" and in sound recordings. With respect to sound
recordings, any musical composition subject to the Copyright Act's com-
pulsory license to make and distribute phonograms, 22 is already excluded
under section 2B-104(7). 23 Section 2B-104(8) expands the exclusion to
cover other works of authorship, whose sound recording rights their copy-
right owners may freely license, for example, dramatic musical composi-
tions licensed for sound recordings, or literary works licensed for books-
on-tape. This means that a contract to publish a novel would be subject to
Article 2B with respect to exploitation of the literary work as a text, but
not with respect to licenses of derivative work rights to create a recorded
24version of a reading of the book.
If Article 2B excludes licenses of audio rights in the novel, what about
licenses to create audiovisual exploitations? If the publishing contract
grants rights to make a film adaptation of the novel, does this aspect of the
contract fall outside Article 2B on the ground that it effects a license to
include the novel (or a screenplay based on it) in a "linear motion pic-
ture?" The August Article 2B draft does not define that term, but the Re-
porter's Note to section 2B-104(8) refers to "movies," and states that sec-
tion 2B-104(8) "excludes traditional licensing in the motion picture ... in-
dustr[y] .... The exclusion is limited to traditional activities and ... is not
an exclusion of the industry. As companies move into on-line systems,
20. U.C.C. § 2B-104(8) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). This text appears in brackets in the
Aug. 1998 draft.
21. See id § 2B- I 02(a)(24) (defining "information" as including "works of author-
ship").
22. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West 1998) (subjecting nondramatic musical composi-
tions to compulsory license following first authorized sound recording).
23. See U.C.C. § 2B-104(7) (Aug, 1, 1998 Draft) (excluding a license that is "a
compulsory license under federal or state law").
24. On the other hand, were the resulting sound recording to be offered to consum-
ers on-line, the contract to deliver the sound recording to the consumer would be gov-
erned by Article 2B.
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software, multi-media, and similar licensing, Article 2B applies."2 This
appears to mean that licensing movie rights in the novel escapes Article
2B, but licensing CD-ROM rights comes within Article 2B. One may
wonder whether these divisions make sense. At least, they seem inconsis-
tent with the goal of uniformity of a contracts regime in a world of "con-
verging" modes of expression and communication, because they make ap-
plication of Article 2B turn on media discrimination.
Thus, with respect to the same author and the same work, Article 2B
may apply to some licenses of rights, but not to others. Article 2B marks a
further distinction between "licenses" and other grants of rights. The text
confines a "license" to a contract that "expressly limits the contractual
rights or permissions granted, expressly prohibits, limits, or controls uses,




Article 2B thus excludes assignments of "all right, title and interest in and
to the copyright," as well as work made for hire agreements regarding
commissioned works. Arguably, an assignment of copyright made in re-
turn for percentage royalties might still fall within Article 28, at least if
the transfer is subject to the condition that the grantee continue to pay roy-
alties during the term of the copyright. Nonpayment of royalties would be
a material breach, resulting in reversion of the copyright to the author.
27
How does Article 2B treat lump-sum assignments? These would not
contain an express limitation on the contractual rights granted. The 1976
Copyright Act, however, imposes a limitation on all transfers of exclusive
rights, including assignments, in all works of authorship other than works
made for hire. These grants are subject to the author's right to terminate
the transfer during a five-year period beginning thirty-five years from the
date of execution of the grant. While the author is not obliged to exercise
this right, neither may she contract it away. 29 Does this mean that assign-
ments that are subject to termination are "licenses" under Article 2B? Ar-
25. U.C.C. § 2B-104 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft); id at Reporter's Note 7.
26. id § 2B-102(a)(28).
27. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§10.15[A], n.20 at 10-124 (1997).
28. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West 1998).
29. See id § 203(a)(5) ("Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any
future grant."). Note that 2B-308's provision for the perpetuity of informational property
rights licenses conflicts with the author's inalienable right under copyright to terminate
exclusive licenses, and therefore would be preempted. See U.C.C. § 2B-105 (Aug. 1,
1998 Draft); id. at Reporter's Note 2. By contrast, since there is no right under copyright
to terminate non-exclusive licenses, section 2B-308 is not incompatible to that extent. See
discussion infra Part II[.A. 1.
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tide 2B's current language suggests otherwise. It appears that the limita-
tion on the scope of the grant must be expressly set forth in the contract,
not merely inherent in the copyright law. If so, Article 213 does not cover
lump-sum assignments. Perhaps, however, if the assignment expressly
stated that it was "subject to the § 203(b) termination right" (or something
to that effect), it would come within Article 2B.
Similarly, a work for hire agreement is not a "license" under Article
2B because it too transfers ownership of all informational rights in the
commissioned work. Moreover, grants of rights in works made for hire are
not subject to termination.30 Arguably, a commissioned work for hire
agreement transfers not copyright ownership, but authorship status. The
commissioned creator of a work made for hire is not a statutory author.
31
If she is not an author, she cannot be an initial copyright owner, so she has
no ownership rights to transfer. This reading, however, seems hypertech-
nical. The effect, after all, of a properly executed work for hire agreement
is to vest rights in the non-creator contractant; absent the contract, the
creator remains the copyright owner. 32 If a commissioned work for hire
agreement is treated as an assignment not subject to termination, it would
come within the exclusion from the scope of Article 2B.
Finally, Article 2B treats authors whose contracts it reaches as "mer-
chants." The characterization has significant consequences: if an author is
a "merchant," s/he is presumed to warrant that the licensed work does not
infringe others' copyrights. 34 "Merchants" are also subject to less stringent
formal requirements under Article 2B's statute of frauds.
35
30. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a) (West 1998).
31. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 201(b) (West 1998).
32. See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 27, § 6.03[c][2][A] at 6A-21 (con-
tending that works made for hire should be considered implied assignments of copyright).
33. Practices in certain of the "copyright industries," however, may call for nu-
ancing that conclusion. For example, the ASCAP membership agreement requires that
composers and lyricists receive 50% of the performance right royalties, regardless of the
work for hire status of the nondramatic musical composition. See Susan Stager, Musical
Performing Rights in the Television Industry: Has the Blanket License Finally Seen Its
Demise?, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 569, 585 (1984) (although composers are television produc-
ers' employees for hire, the producer's music publishing company distributes the
"writer's share" (50%) of the royalties to the composer); ASCAP, ASCAP membership
agreement, Art. 7 (visited Mar. 30, 1998) <http://www.ascap.com/membership/
agreement/agreement.html>.
34. See U.C.C. § 2B-401(a) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). Section 2B-404(b)(l) makes it
clear, however, that the licensor does not warrant the work's "aesthetics, market appeal,
or subjective quality." Id. § 2B-404(b)(1).
35. See id § 2B-201(d).
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What makes an author a "merchant" under Article 2B? The warranty
provision concerns merchants "regularly dealing in information or rights
of the kind:" this might suggest that veteran authors are merchants for
purposes of section 2B-401, but neophytes are not. Article 2B, however,
defines a "merchant" as "a person that deals in information or informa-
tional rights of the kind or that otherwise by the person's occupation holds
itself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or infor-
mation involved in the transaction, whether or not the person previously
engaged in such transactions ....,36 The last phrase in the definition sug-
gests that the drafters are seeking to avoid distinguishing between first-
time and seasoned licensors. Moreover, it is clearer than in prior drafts that
this provision does target authors. The author will have "knowledge or
skill peculiar to the information" because the "information" is the copy-.
righted work the author created. In addition, an author could be said to
"deal in" works of authorship and in "informational rights" (i.e., copy-
right); indeed, if the author is a professional, those dealings furnish her
livelihood.
III. WHAT AUTHOR-RELEVANT MANDATORY OR DEFAULT
RULES DOES ARTICLE 2B SET FORTH, AND HOW WOULD
THEY APPLY?
Traditionally, the exploitation of works of authorship is contract-
intensive, employing highly detailed agreements, particularly in the areas
of publishing and performing rights. As a result, Article 2B will make the
greatest difference to authors to the extent that its rules are mandatory
rather than default. Examination of the current text, however, shows that
there are no relevant mandatory substantive rules,37 although there are
relevant rules requiring that any departure from those rules be introduced
in an authenticated record.33 This means that the domain of Article 2B
with respect to authors is limited to situations where there is either no
written contract at all, or where Article 2B introduces contract rules when
the parties had provided none, or where the terms are ambiguous. The do-
main of Article 2B is further limited by its recognition that federal copy-
36. Id. § 2B-102(a)(33).
37. See id. §2B-106.
38. See U.C.C. § 2B-106(6) (Aug. I, 1998 Draft); id § 2B-201. The rules requiring
written derogation concern the scope of a transfer, and transfers of non-exclusive rights.
Both of these are of considerable interest to authors. See the discussion, infra Part III.A.1.
For a discussion of authenticated records under Article 2B and "signed writings" under
the Copyright Act, see infra Part 1II.A.
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right policies prevail over state law provisions.39 For example, Article
2B's provisions cannot displace the federal copyright requirement of a
signed writing to transfer exclusive rights.40 On the other hand, Article 2B
may lend content to the terms "signed" and "writing."
The authors most implicated by Article 2B may be freelance writers,
photographers, and artists who contribute to periodicals or other publica-
tions whose publishers do not systematically execute detailed contracts
with the contributors. 41 But to the extent that informality or imprecision
prevail in other areas of the "copyright industries," many authors may be
touched by Article 2B's default rules.
A. Default Rules that May Enhance Authors' Control Over Their
Works
Section 2B- 106 states the basic principle of freedom of contract, but
also sets forth certain rules that the parties may not vary.42 These rules in-
clude "the limitations on enforceability in section 2B-201 . Section 2B-
201 is Article 2B's statute of frauds. It requires, for agreements whose to-
tal value requires "payment of $5,000 or more ... " and "is a license for an
agreed duration" of one year or more, a record "authenticated ' 44 by the
party against whom the agreement is to be enforced. Where, however, the
39. See U.C.C. § 2B-105 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
40. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (subjecting the validity of a transfer of copyright
ownership to execution by the grantor of a written and signed "instrument of conveyance
or a note or memorandum of the transfer."); U.C.C. § 2B-105 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft); id. at
Reporter's Note 2.
41. For example, setting forth the terms of the "agreement" on the back of the free-
lance author's payment check, thus purporting to equate endorsement of the check with
execution of the contract, appears to be a frequent means of dealing with freelance writ-
ers, photographers and artists. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 552 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 567 (1995), on remand, 960 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Tasini v. New York Times Co., 981 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
42. See U.C.C. § 2B-106(a)-(b) (Aug. I, 1998 Draft).
43. Id § 2B-106(b)(6).
44. Id. § 2B-201(a)(1)-(2). The August 1998 draft differs significantly from the
April 1998 and earlier drafts, in making the dollar value and duration of the agreement
cumulative, rather than alternative criteria for application of the authentication require-
ment. It is not clear that this change is intentional or desirable. The effect of the change is
to validate non-authenticated licenses of any dollar amount, so long as its duration is less
than a year. Not only does this change seem incompatible with consumer protection con-
cerns; but also it is inconsistent with U.C.C. Article 2's statute of frauds, which requires a
writing if the price of the goods sold is $500 or more. See id. § 2-201(l) (1996). But see,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CLASSES OF CONTRACTS COVERED § 110(l)(e)
(1979) (applying the statute of frauds to contracts "not to be performed within one year
from the making").
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co-contractants are merchants, as would be the case between an author and
a commercial exploiter, subsequent dispatch of a "record in confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents" will bind the recipient unless
she notifies her objection in a record within ten days of receipt of the con-
firmation.45 Second, and more significantly, section 2B-201 imposes more
stringent formal requirements on variations from a provision of particular
concern to authors: section 2B-307 regarding the scope of licensing
agreements. What are the consequences of this rule for authors?
1. Copyright Licenses Whose Value Exceed $5, 000 and Which
Endure for One Year or More
Federal copyright law requires that any transfer of exclusive rights
must be in writing and signed by the grantor. 6 Article 2B does not purport
to detract from that requirement. 4 ' As a result, a transfer of exclusive
rights for $5,000 or less whose duration is for less than one year must still
be effected by a signed writing. By contrast, a grant of non-exclusive
rights under copyright need not be in writing; an oral agreement, or con-
duct from which an agreement can be inferred, suffice.4 8 Hence, as a mat-
ter of copyright law, a grant of non-exclusive rights whose value exceeds
$5,000, and which endures for at least one year, need not be in writing.
Under section 2B-201, however, that grant would be subject to the formal
requirement of a record which the party to be charged has authenticated.
Article 2B's statute of frauds provision provokes two questions. First,
if Article 2B may not authorize fewer formal requirements than the Copy-
right Act mandates, may it nonetheless impose greater formality than the
copyright law demands? Second, with respect to grants of non-exclusive
licenses, would section 2B-201, in fact, afford more protection to authors
than current case law extends?
Another way of posing the first question is to inquire whether federal
or state law governs the validity of a grant of non-exclusive rights under
copyright. Section 2B-105 recognizes that a provision of Article 2B is not
enforceable to the extent that it is preempted by federal law. Thus, where
45. U.C.C. § 2B-201(d) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
46. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West 1998).
47. See U.C.C. § 2B-105 and Reporter's Note 2 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
48. See, e.g.. I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996); Avtec Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994); Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d
555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991) (finding that, absent a writ-
ten agreement, delivery of a special effects video for inclusion in audiovisual work evi-
dences a grant of non-exclusive rights, but not a transfer of exclusive rights).
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federal copyright law sets forth specific substantive or formal protections
for authors, Article 2B cannot derogate from those guarantees. But where
federal law is silent, is there more room for state regulation that would en-
hance the protection of authors? A grant of non-exclusive rights is not a
transfer of copyright ownership;49 given the lesser consequences of grant-
ing non-exclusive rights, Congress perhaps determined that authors do not
require the copyright law to impose as much protection in the contract
process with respect to non-exclusive licenses as authors may need from
the copyright law regarding alienating copyright ownership. But it is one
thing to infer that federal copyright policy does not mandate a formal pre-
requisite to the validity of a grant of non-exclusive rights, and another to
conclude that, therefore, Congress sought to prohibit states from according
additional protection to the process of licensing lesser rights. It seems
more reasonable to conclude instead that federal copyright law does not
"occupy the field" of non-exclusive rights licensing, that the state law here
at issue is compatible with general federal policies, and that states may
therefore attach formal requirements to the validity of non-exclusive
grants. 50
Assuming federal law does not preempt the section 2B-201 formal re-
quirements with respect to non-exclusive licenses worth more than $5,000,
and that endure for one year or more, would section 2B-201 in fact make a
difference to authors? The one year minimum could be significant, be-
cause many non-exclusive licenses may cover a longer period. For exam-
ple, suppose nothing was said about the license's duration, but the nature
of the exploitation inherently exceeds one year. This characterization
would apply to many publishing agreements (even agreements to publish
in a monthly periodical could be affected, if, for example, the publisher
continues to distribute back issues past one year), as well as to performing
or exhibition rights agreements. Setting aside one-time uses, which would
remain uncovered, Article 2B would, at least at first blush, seem to inject
49. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998) (defining "transfer of copyright ownership"
* as explicitly excluding non-exclusive licensees).
50. See, e.g., Grappo v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 56 F.3d 427 (2d Cir.
1995); Freedman v. Select Info. Systems, Inc., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19664, at *I1
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1983) (applying state statute of frauds to non-exclusive license);
Myers v. Waverly Fabrics, 475 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff'das modi-
fied by 489 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1985) (holding a non-exclusive license incapable of perform-
ance within one year statute of frauds). But see, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 27, §
10.03[A][8].
[Vol. 13:945
AUTHORS AS LICENSORS UNDER ARTICLE 2B
potentially author-protective formality into the process of contracting for
many grants of non-exclusive rights.
5
Now consider the $5,000 floor. Perhaps not many non-exclusive li-
censes for individual author-owned works other than software are worth
more than $5,000; for those that are, perhaps, few authors would be
granting such rights without a written contract in any event. But there may
be a relevant class of works and authors. Consider the following hypo-
thetical, inspired by a real case. MegaROM Company offers Fred Effex
$10,000 to prepare a special effects sequence for inclusion in MegaROM's
impending interactive CD-ROM videogame, "It Came From the Ti-
tanic."52 Fred creates the sequence and delivers it to MegaROM. No writ-
ten agreements have been concluded; like their Hollywood antecedents,
CD-ROM producers "do lunch, not contracts." 53 MegaROM takes the se-
quence and runs; Fred, who has not been fully paid, seeks an injunction
and damages against MegaROM's distribution of the videogame, on the
ground that it violates Fred's copyright in the incorporated sequence.
As a matter of federal copyright law, MegaROM's first defense, that
Fred transferred his reproduction and distribution rights to MegaROM,
will fail, because there is no signed writing. On the other hand, Mega-
ROM's second defense, that Fred granted non-exclusive rights, will suc-
ceed, because the non-exclusive grant may be manifested by conduct, and
Fred's delivery of the sequence to MegaROM evidences his agreement to
the sequence's incorporation and distribution. Fred has only a state'law
claim for breach of contract to recover the unpaid portion of the $10,000. 5
4
51. However, to the extent state statutes of frauds already apply to non-exclusive
grants of copyright, Article 2B will represent a net gain to authors only if its version is
more protective than most state versions. To the extent that Article 2B's statute of frauds
is less protective than state versions, Article 2B will, by displacing state statutes of
frauds, leave authors worse off. See U.C.C, § 2B-105 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). For example,
by making the duration and dollar amount criteria cumulative, the August 1998 draft will
not require authentication of a license costing more than $5000 if its duration is less than
a year, where an applicable state statute that turned on price, independently of duration,
might otherwise have applied.
52. Because the videogame is interactive, it would not seem to be a "linear motion
picture;" a contract to include an interactive video sequence within the game thus would
not be covered by the 2B-104(8) exclusion. This would be true even though videogames
are considered "audiovisual works" under the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Williams Elecs. v.
Arctic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852,
856 (2d Cir. 1982). The category of "audiovisual works" is broader than that of "motion
pictures," see 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (defining both terms), and afortiori is broader than that
of "linear motion pictures" (the latter term does not appear in the Copyright Act).
53. See Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990).
54. See id
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Under section 2B-201 (which applies because MegaROM intends to
distribute the game for a period longer than a year, and its agreement with
Fred called for payment exceeding $5,000), MegaROM could not allege a
grant of non-exclusive rights in defense to Fred's copyright infringement
claim, unless there was a "record" that MegaROM "authenticated," 5 or, if
Fred is considered a "merchant," a "record in confirmation" that Fred re-
ceived from MegaROM "within a reasonable time" of the conclusion of
their agreement. 6 Section 2B-102 defines a "record" as "information in-
scribed on a tangible medium or stored in an electronic or other medium
and retrievable in perceivable form." 57 Under the facts of our hypothetical,
there is no "record;" MegaROM can only allege Fred's conduct in support
of the existence of the agreement. If, absent the record, there would be no
enforceable grant, then MegaROM would not be a non-exclusive licensee;
it instead would be a copyright infringer, and Fred could enjoin the video
game's distribution.
58
MegaROM, however, is likely to succeed in showing the existence of
a non-exclusive license under either of two of Article 2B's exceptions to
the requirement of a record. First, an agreement is enforceable "if a per-
formance was tendered or the information was made available by one
party and the tender was accepted or accessed by the other ... "59 Second,
no record is required if "the party against which enforcement is sought
admits in its pleading or testimony or otherwise in court that a contract has
been formed .... ,,60 The hypothetical's facts indicate that performance was
tendered and accepted, because Fred delivered the commissioned special
effects video, and MegaROM incorporated it. This litigation exception
may also apply to Fred, because the agreement would be recounted in the
pleadings or testimony. The litigation exception appears in somewhat con-
voluted form in Fred's case, however, because Fred is not seeking en-
forcement of the contract against MegaROM; he is claiming the contract is
invalid, and that he, therefore, has an infringement action. MegaROM
would be the party to allege the validity of the contract, in effect seeking
55. U.C.C. § 2B-201(a)(l) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
56. Id. § 2B-201(d).
57. Id § 2B-102(a)(39).
58. This construction "favors" authors to the extent that it invalidates the agree-
ment, thus leaving the way open to the author to allege copyright infringement. But if the
agreement is unenforceable, the author will not be paid the contract price (unless it be-
comes the measure of damages in a successful infringement action). On the other hand,
an author who can enjoin the exploiter's use is in a stronger bargaining position than one
who merely has a claim for contract damages.
59. Id. § 2B-201(c)(l)-(2).
60. Id.
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its enforcement against Fred, to prevent him from enjoining the distribu-
tion of the video game.
If either exception overrides the requirement of a record, then Fred
may be no better off than before Article 2B intervened. On the other hand,
MegaROM's best defense against the infringement claim is to insist on the
existence of the contract; in so doing it not only confirms its obligation to
pay Fred, but it acknowledges that the content of the contract includes all
the default rules associated with an Article 2B agreement. As we will see,
some of these rules may favor Fred.
So far, perhaps, so good for authors. To the extent that there is no "re-
cord" of the transaction (and the transaction is worth more than $5,000
and the grant endures for at least one year), authors may be better off with
Article 2B than without it. But any exploiter who takes a break from lunch
to send or acknowledge a record of the deal can easily help himself under
section 2B-201. Consider the following variations on the Fred Ef-
fex/MegaROM relationship. Suppose Fred sent the interactive video se-
quence to MegaROM by e-mail, together with a cover note to the effect
that the sequence MegaROM commissioned Fred to make for $10,000 is
attached. That e-mail would count as a record. 61 MegaROM can authenti-
cate the record in a return response. 62 Or suppose that Fred e-mails the se-
quence without a cover note (or physically delivers a disk); now no record
originates with Fred. But, if Fred is a "merchant," then MegaROM, having
taken a reasonable time to wake up from lunch, can send an e-mail (or
other tangible medium of communication) to Fred confirming the agree-
ment. If, within ten days, Fred has not sent a record objecting to the con-
tents of MegaROM's confirmation, MegaROM will have rendered its
agreement enforceable, and can therefore assert that it is the grantee of
non-exclusive rights in Fred's sequence.
63
2. Substantive Limitations on the Licensee 's Rights
Let us suppose that Fred and MegaROM have a contract that is en-
forceable because, despite the absence of a record, performance was ten-
dered and accepted, or because MegaROM's subsequent confirmation
satisfied Article 2B's formal requirements. What is the substance of their
61. If the record is not "authenticated," for example, by a digital signature or other
form of encryption, then it probably would not be considered a "signed writing" under
the Copyright Act; Fred thus will not have transferred exclusive rights.
62. The August draft is more restrictive than the February version, which validated
an agreement set forth in a record "to which that party manifested assent." U.C.C. § 2B-
201(aX2) (Feb. 1998 Draft).
63. See U.C.C. § 2B-201(d) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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agreement? We know only that the parties agreed on the preparation and
delivery of a special effects sequence to be incorporated in the "It Came
From the Titanic" videogame for $10,000. For example, the parties speci-
fied neither the scope of the agreement, nor its duration, nor whether
MegaROM could also transfer the special effects sequence to another pro-
ducer. The more informal (not to say, sloppy) the parties' dealings, the
greater Article 2B's role in supplementing the details of the agreement.
64
With respect to the scope of an agreement and the transferability of the
rights conveyed, Article 2B sets forth default rules which may be varied
"only by a record that is: (1) sufficient to indicate that a contract has been
made; and (2) authenticated, or prepared and delivered to the other party,
by the party against which enforcement is sought."65 For agreements such
as Fred's, where the "record" (to the extent there is one) does not specify
its scope, this means that section 2B-307 will define the extent of the
rights licensed. Indeed, even where the parties' agreement is sufficiently
formal to transfer exclusive rights under copyright,. section 2B-307 will
still define its scope, unless the parties specify otherwise in an authenti-
cated record. There is no conflict with federal copyright law, because
questions going to the scope of a grant of copyright (as opposed to its va-
lidity) are considered matters of state contract law.66 Section 2B-307 pro-
vides, inter alia, that
A license contains an implied limitation that the licensee shall
not exceed the expressly granted contractual rights or exercise
informational rights in the information other than [those "ex-
pressly described" or which are "necessary in the ordinary
course to exercise the expressly granted contractual rights"].
However, use of the information or informational rights in a
manner inconsistent with this implied limitation is not a breach
of contract if the use would be permitted under applicable law in
the absence of the limitation. 6
7
Suppose that Alice Author granted exclusive rights to publish her arti-
cle in MagnaMagazine, but the written publication contract did not men-
64. If the agreement was silent as to whether Fred was representing to MegaROM
that the sequence did not violate third parties' copyright or related interests, 2B-401
would supply a warranty from Fred, if Fred is a "merchant," that "the information and
informational rights shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by
way of infringement or misappropriation .... " Id. § 2B-40 1(a).
65. Id. § 2B-201(e)(l)-(2).
66. See, e.g, Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
67. U.C.C. § 2B-307(b) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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tion electronic rights. Suppose also that Magna now wishes to publish CD-
ROM versions of selections from back issues of the magazine, as well as
to license to Noxis Data Corp. the rights to include the article in an online
electronic database containing a vast collection of articles from many
newspapers and periodicals. Which, if any, of these additional exploita-
tions would be permissible under section 2B-307?
Do CD-ROM and database rights "exceed the expressly granted con-
tractual rights" in Alice's publishing agreement? Arguably, the agreement
to publish in a magazine is not medium-specific; at least, Alice's agree-
ment is not expressly limited to print media. If, however, at the time of the
agreement, MagnaMagazine existed only in print form, the medium limi-
tation may be implicit in the agreement, and the subsequent electronic ver-
sion would exceed the rights granted. The rights Magna seeks to exercise
or license do not involve a simple medium transposition of the magazine
in which the article was published, but, rather, in the case of the CD-
ROM, a new compilation of selected, previously published articles, and, in
the case of the online database, a compilation of separately accessible arti-
cles from multiple sources.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that Magna could successfully claim to
exercise or license the electronic rights on the ground that these exploita-
tions are "necessary in the ordinary course to exercise the expressly
granted contractual rights." 68 These exploitations involve different uses,
not mere medium updates of the magazine issue in which Alice's article
appears. While licensing inclusion of magazine articles in electronic data-
bases may be a frequent business practice, it is not "necessary" to publica-
tion of the magazine itself. Therefore, CD-ROM exploitation exceeds the
scope of the grant. By contrast, as the Reporter's Note suggests, some al-
teration of the article in order to conform it to the magazine's style or for-
mat, may implicate the author's derivative works right, but is reasonably
necessary to the specific exploitation that the author permitted.69
Section 2B-307 offers a final basis that MagnaMagazine might invoke
to justify its CD-ROM and database exploitations. Magna might assert that
these exploitations "would be permitted under applicable law in the ab-
sence of the [implied] limitation." The Reporter's Note cites reverse engi-
neering of licensed computer software as an example of a use exceeding
the scope of the contract, but that might be a fair use under copyright law,
68. Id. § 2B-307.
69. See id. § 2B-307, at Reporter's Note I (citing example of film clip licensed for
inclusion in a CD-ROM product; license reasonably includes "right to crop or modify the
size of the clip to fit the media .... ").
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and therefore "authorized" under Article 2B.7 ° Would the Copyright Act
permit MagnaMagazine to publish its CD-ROM compilation or license
database rights to Noxis? The Act grants copyright owners of "collective
works," such as encyclopedias and periodicals, a special privilege to re-
produce and distribute the contributions to the collective work (whose
separate copyrights the collective works proprietor does not own) "as part
of that collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later
collective work in the same series.",7 1 Since the CD-ROM is a new com-
pilation corresponding to none of the individual issues of the magazine, it
would not qualify under the "that collective work" criterion. 72 By contrast,
the question whether licensing the entire contents of magazine issues to a
third party database comes within the collective work copyright owner's
"privilege" is currently unsettled.73 Assuming that the Copyright Act nei-
ther authorizes the collective work proprietor to license others to exploit
the contributions, nor characterizes as a "revision" of the proprietor's par-
ticular collective work a multi-source compilation whose contents con-
sumers may separately access, then Article 2B would not permit Mag-
naMagazine to engage in these exploitations without Alice Author's fur-
ther accord.
Section 2B-307's "necessary to exercise" standard also compares fa-
vorably (for authors) with current case law construing the scope of copy-
right licenses. Decisions addressing the application of "old licenses" to
"new media" when the language of the grant is ambiguous (for example,
whether a pre-VCR-era grant of rights to record music onto the soundtrack
of a motion picture includes the right to make and distribute videocassettes
of the film 7 ) do not uniformly attribute the benefits of the new mode of
exploitation to grantors or to grantees. While the First and Ninth Circuits
appear to presume that authors retain those rights, the Second Circuit has
held that grantors who reasonably could have foreseen the new mode of
exploitation must bear the burden of reserving rights in related future
uses. 75 The section 2B-307 "necessary in the ordinary course to exercise
the expressly granted contractual use" standard appears more restrictive
70. See id at Reporter's Note 2.
71. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(c) (West 1998).
72. See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes v. Disney, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); Cohen v.
Paramount, 845 F. 2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
75. Compare Cohen, 845 F.2d 851, and Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828 (1993), with Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968), and Boosey & Hawkes v.
Disney, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
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than the Second Circuit's approach, because availing oneself of a related
new mode of exploitation (for example, videocassettes) is generally not
functionally "necessary"-as opposed to economically desirable for the
licensee-to exercising rights in the old mode of exploitation (theatrical
motion picture exhibition). Article 2B thus appears to leave authors in a
better position than under the Second Circuit's approach, and in at least as
good a position as under the First and Ninth Circuits' analyses. Courts ap-
plying section 2B-307 might also look to European copyright contract case
law for further guidance: several European Union member countries'
copyright laws provide that, in the absence of contractual specification
otherwise, the scope of a grant of rights is limited to those exploitations
that are necessary to accomplish the purpose of the grant.76
Suppose that, instead of acquiring exclusive rights from Alice, Mag-
naMagazine had received only a non-exclusive license. What then of
Magna's ability to exercise CD-ROM and database rights? If exercising
these rights requires Magna to sublicense them, section 2B-502 defers to
the general copyright principle that a grantee of non-exclusive rights may
not transfer them without the licensor's consent. 7 7 By contrast, if Mag-
naMagazine sought to exercise these rights itself, section 2B-307's rules
should apply; it would be anomalous were the scope of the non-exclusive
grant deemed broader than the grant formalized in an authenticated record.
Indeed, the broader Magna's non-exclusive rights, the narrower Alice's
copyright ownership as a practical matter, since Magna's successful asser-
tion of non-exclusive CD-ROM or database rights, for example, means
that any "exclusive" CD-ROM license Alice grants in her article must co-
exist with Magna's non-exclusive rights.
78
76. See, e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Electronic Rights and Wrongs in Germany and
the Netherlands, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 151 (Winter 1998) (addressing the appli-
cation of this principle in German and Dutch copyright law).
77. Section 2B-502(l)(A) makes transfers of non-exclusive rights ineffective "if
prohibited under other applicable law." See § 2B-502(l)(A) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft); id. at
Reporter's Note 1. The Reporter's Notes recognize that under federal copyright policy,
the licensee of non-exclusive rights may not sublicense those rights without the licensor's
consent. The licensee may pass along her physical copy of a work of authorship, but not
together with any copying privileges, unless the licensee effaces or surrenders any addi-
tional copies she had made. Cf. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West 1998). Section 2B-502(l)(A)
does not, however, set forth how the requisite "consent" must be expressed.
For a discussion of non-transferability of non-exclusive copyright licenses, see, for
example, In re Patient Educational Media, 210 Bankr. 237, 240 (Bankr. Ct. S.D.N.Y.
1997), and decisions cited therein.
78. Query whether this co-existence is inconsistent with the warranty that author-
"merchants" are presumed to extend under section 2B-401(b)(2), that the exclusive rights
are indeed exclusive.
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Moreover, it appears that this coexistence would endure for the term of
the copyright: section 2B-308 provides that when the agreement does not
specify its duration,
the duration of a license is perpetual as to the contractual rights
and contractual use restrictions if... the license authorizes the li-
censee to integrate the licensed information or informational
rights into a product intended for distribution or public perform-
ance by the licensee.79
Because Alice's agreement authorized MagnaMagazine to incorporate
the article into an issue of the magazine that will be publicly distributed, it
appears that the non-exclusive license will be perpetual (subject to can-
cellation for breach, and, implicitly, expiration of the copyright); the per-
petuity of Magna's license undermines the value to other potential licen-
sees of Alice's "exclusive" rights in the article.
80
Finally, Article 2B may modestly help bind publishers to the authors
with whom they contract. Section 2B-502 permits the parties to provide
for the non-transferability by the licensee of informational rights.8 This
implies, however, that the default position permits publishers to assign
their rights and obligations. Thus, for example, Alice Author may have
signed with Prestige Publisher, but if their agreement does not prohibit
Prestige from assigning its rights, Prestige may hand Alice's manuscript
off to Pulp Publisher. On the other hand, section 2B-505 sets a different
default: the licensee may not delegate or subcontract if the licensor has a
substantial interest in the actual promisor's performance. 82 From the
author's point of view, there may be some tension between the free as-
signability principle on the one hand, and the protection of a party's "sub-
stantial interest" in obtaining performance from the original co-
contractant. Perhaps section 2B-502 should incorporate the substantial
interest bar to assignability.
So far, we have considered how Article 2B may help authors when
their agreements tend toward the informal. The combination of rules that
promote the easy formation of enforceable agreements with Article 2B's
substantive default rules can supply some meaningful protections (as well
79. U.C.C. § 2B-308(2)(B) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
80. By contrast, if the license granted exclusive rights, it would be subject to termi-
nation, 35 years following execution of the grant, under section 203(a)(3) of the 1976
Copyright Act. Since 2B-308's provision for perpetuity of the license can conflict with
the Copyright Act termination right, the federal right must prevail.
81. See id § 2B-502(2).
82. See id. § 2B-505(a)(2).
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as some pitfalls). But how do authors fare under Article 2B when the con-
tracts-written by the exploiter party-are highly detailed? Here, the same
formation-promoting rules can work to authors' detriment when the con-
tract's contents override the substantive defaults: authors may end up as-
senting all-too-instantly to disadvantageous terms.
B. Rules that Increase Authors' Vulnerability to Exploiters
Section 201(d) of the Copyright Act confirms the divisibility of rights
under copyright; it permits authors to subdivide and transfer any of the
exclusive rights. Section 204(a) subjects the validity of a grant of exclu-
sive rights to the signing by the grantor of a "note or memorandum of the
transfer." Together, these provisions are intended to ensure that the author
does not blindly grant exclusive rights.83 Compared with the friction that
the Copyright Act builds in, does Article 2B make it too easy for authors
to license rights in their works?
With respect to non-exclusive rights, Article 2B does, indeed, pose the
risk that authors may too easily be bound to onerous terms. Suppose, for
example, that a publisher sent an e-mail to an author proposing to dis-
seminate the work, and asking the author to click on the "I agree" box.
The terms of the agreement are not included in the e-mail, but the author is
referred to the publisher's web page for the content of the terms. Under
section 2B-1 11, the clicking author will be deemed to have "assented" to
the contract, whether or not she actually reads the terms.8 4 As a result, if
the terms provide for a non-exclusive license in all media, now known or
later developed, for the duration of the copyright, and any renewals and
extensions thereof, the author is bound. Since, however, the Copyright Act
does not grace non-exclusive grants with the same paternalistic attention,
and limitations, as transfers of exclusive rights, this result, however un-
fortunate, does not conflict with the copyright law.
The same conclusion applies to "releases" of non-exclusive rights un-
der copyright pursuant to section 2B-206. Suppose, for example, that a
publisher announced a contest for the most distinctive food preparation
photograph, and set forth as part of the terms of participation, that all
83. See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990); Eden
Toys v. Floralee Undergarments, 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982); Pamiloff v. Giant Rec-
ords, 794 F. Supp. 933, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (The purpose of section 204(a) is "to pro-
vide protection for the author and creator of copyrighted material against fraudulent
claims of transfer. Thus we understand the policy underlying section 204(a) to be tipped
somewhat in favor of the original holder of the copyrighted material.").
84. See U.C.C. § 2B-l 11 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). According to Reporter's Note 3, Il-
lustration 1, the contract's terms can be in another, hyperlinked, document that the con-
tractant need not in fact read, so long as the party had the opportunity to review the terms.
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contestants granted the publisher the right to reproduce, distribute and
transmit the images, in all media now known or later developed. Under
Article 2B, the act of participating constitutes manifesting assent if the re-
lease language was prominent and called the party's attention. No writing
or even a click-on is necessary here; sending the work in will suffice.
85
Holding non-exclusive licenses, however, may not be enough for the
exploiterparties, since non-exclusive licensees may not sublicense without
consent, 8nor do they have standing to sue for copyright infringement.
8 7
Since Article 2B does not specify how formal the consent to sublicensing
must be, the exploiter party may well be able to secure that consent
through the same click-on assent that validated the non-exclusive license.
For example, the hyperlinkable terms of the agreement might include the
required consent to sublicense. The standing problem is more intractable:
only copyright owners have standing to sue for copyright infringement,
and a non-exclusive licensee is not a copyright owner.
Suppose, therefore, that the e-mail's referenced terms are the same,
except that the grant is of exclusive rights; will a click-on assent or an act
of participating suffice? Not unless the clicking or participating consti-
tuted a "signature" under copyright law.89 Under Article 2B's own terms,
more than merely clicking is required: Article 2B equates a "signature"
not with mere "assent" but with an "authentication." "'Authenticate'
means to sign, or otherwise to execute or adopt a symbol or sound, or en-
crypt or similarly process a record in whole or part, with intent of the
authenticating person to ... adopt or accept the terms or a particular term
of a record that includes or is logically associated or linked with the
authentication or to which a record containing the authentication refers
... ,90 According to the Reporter's Notes, an authentication "expands on
the traditional idea and general effect of a signature .... Adoption or exe-
cution of electronic or other text or a symbol with intent [to] authenticate a
85. See U.C.C. § 2B-206(a)(l) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft); id. at Reporter's Note 2. The
illustration in the Note concerns participation in a chat room, and the participants' release
to the chat-room operator of the right to publish their comments. But if no consideration
is offered for the license, then, as a matter of copyright law, the license is revocable.
86. See id § 2B-502.
87. See, e.g., I.A.E. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775, 776 n.10 (7th Cir. 1996); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 4.4.1.1 (2d ed. 1998).
88. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West 1998) (identifying an infringer as "[a]nyone
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ...") (emphasis added).
The section 101 definition of "transfer of copyright ownership" excludes non-exclusive
licenses. Id. § 101.
89. See id § 204(a).
90. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(3) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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record that would be a signature under prior law is an authentication under
Article 2B. This includes use with requisite intent of identifiers such as a
PIN number." 9' The emphasis on intent suggests that Article 2B was not
designed to facilitate authors' inadvertent transfers of copyright owner-
ship. But is there nonetheless a significant risk that an author might
"authenticate" a record that she would not "sign?, 92
If authentication may be made more easily than a traditional "signa-
ture," is there a conflict between the copyright law and Article 2B, so that
the copyright law should preempt Article 2B with respect to exclusive li-
censes? Put another way, which law, federal copyright law or state con-
tract law, defines what a "signature" is? Does the Copyright Act give any
indication that the term "signature" has independent federal content dis-
tinct from the term's meaning at state law?
The case law on these issues is sparse, but those few courts that have
addressed the issue perceive independent federal content to the section
204(a) requirements, rather than a renvoi to state law standards; courts
have held, for example, that the standard for a "note or memorandum" un-
der section 204(a) was more stringent than that imposed by the state stat-
ute of frauds.93 Arguably, any appearance of a term in the Copyright Act
that the Act does not itself define calls for development of a federal com-
mon law definition, rather than an interstitial resort to state law norms.
94
Thus, for example, in CCNV v. Reid, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a
federal law definition of "employee" for purposes of determining whether
a commissioned work created by a hired party is an "employee"-created
91. Id. § 2B-102, at Reporter's Note 3.
92. There may also be a danger that authors, as "merchants," could be bound with-
out authenticating an agreement: 2B-201(d) provides that the authentication requirement
may be met, between merchants, if one party sends a record to the other, and the recipient
does not timely object to the record's contents. Applied to author contracts, this could
mean that the publisher could convert a non-exclusive license into an exclusive license if
the publisher sent the author a record characterizing the license as exclusive, and if the
author failed to object. Even if that result might be possible under Article 2B, however, it
is inconsistent with the Copyright Act's formal requirements: an unresponded-to "con-
firmation" from the grantee is not a "writing" "signed by the owner of the rights con-
veyed," 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West 1998).
93. See Konigsberg Int'l., Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1993); Pamiloffv.
Giant Records, 794 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
94. Under the 1909 Act, one test of whether a contract claim "arose under" the fed-
eral copyright law, thereby justifying the development of a "federal common law" of
contracts, was whether the controversy "presents a case where a distinctive policy of the
Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim." Harms v. Eliscu,
339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.). If that analysis still applies to the 1976
Act, the question remains whether section 204(a) implicates distinctive federal policies.
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work made for hire.95 The Court looked to state common law sources (the
Restatement of Agency) to devise the federal standard, but it is clear that
the court was applying newly-stated federal criteria to the statute's inter-
stices, rather than perceiving a Congressional delegation to state law to
complete the statutory scheme. 96 But even if courts agreed that federal
common law supplies the meaning of the terms "signature" and "note or
memorandum of the transfer," we still do not know if federal courts would
end up adopting the standards of Article 2B as part of the federal common
law, as the Supreme Court adopted the standards of the Restatement of
Agency.
Adopting Article 2B's standards would arguably be consistent with the
technology-neutrality that characterizes much of the Copyright Act. For
example, the Act specifies that "[c]opyright protection subsists, in accor-
dance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed .... The provi-
sions on transfers of copyright, however, may not anticipate the technol-
ogy of digital signatures or transitory digital "records." The most revealing
provision is section 205(a) on recordation of transfers, which provides:
Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertain-
ing to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the
document filed for recordation bears the actual signature of the
person who executed it, or if it is accompanied by a sworn or
other official certification that is a true copy of the original,
signed document.98
Given the "actual signature" requirement of 205(a), the same quality
of signature is implicit in 204(a)'s requirement that the note or memoran-
dum of the transfer be "in writing and signed." That is, it seems unlikely
that the signature necessary to effect a transfer of copyright ownership
should be less "actual" than the signature necessary to record the effected
transfer.
The Copyright Act's signature requirements thus are not technology-
neutral; a photocopy of a handwritten signature will not suffice. 99 Autopen
95. 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
96. Compare DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (looking to state law
to complete definition of "children" under 1909 Act).
97. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
98. U.C.C. § 205(a) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft) (emphasis supplied).
99. The photocopied signature may be accepted for recordation, if it is properly
certified, but the certification requires that the recorded document be a "true copy of the
original, signed document;" that implies that the original document bore an original, not a
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and similar mechanical facsimile signing devices probably are also ex-
cluded. But these exclusions are not necessarily inconsistent with Article
2B. The concept of "actual signature" may mean handwriting, or it may
mean reliable evidence that the copyright owner herself executed the
document. 0 0 Handwriting is a proxy for the latter concept, but may not be
the exclusive means of ensuring and proving that the copyright owner
agreed to the transfer. Article 2B's authentication provisions strive to
achieve the same result.'
0
'
If an "authentication" is as reliable as a traditional signature, Article
2B's electronic substitutes would meet copyright norms, unless one inter-
prets the Copyright Act's signed writing standard to require not only that
the author herself execute the transfer, but also that the author reflect on
the consequence of entering into the contract. While I believe the latter
proposition underlies section 204(a) to some extent, I must acknowledge
that if the Act is occasionally paternalistic, it does not assume full custody
of all authors' alienations. For example, there would be no section 204(a)
challenge to a transfer effected by an author who physically signed the
document without reading it.
Might Article 2B yield to the Copyright Act's other formal prerequi-
site to the validity of a transfer of exclusive rights? Where copyright law
requires "an instrument of conveyance or a note or memorandum of the
transfer," Article 2B demands a "record." The Reporter's Note to section
2B-102(a)(39) tells us that a "record" "does not require permanent storage
or anything beyond temporary recordation."'' 0 2 For Article 2B, a "record"
corresponds to the Copyright Law concept of a "copy;"' 1 3 "copies" in
copyright are "material objects in which a work is fixed ...;" a fixation
need only be "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [the work] to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration. '' i 4 But saying that a "record" is a "fixation," does
photocopied, signature. In the Article 2B context, query what would be a "true copy" of
the "authenticated record"?
100. See, e.g., Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pickney, 881 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990) (rejecting document executed by author's lawyer; even if
lawyer intended to memorialize production agreement, author's own signature or express
authorization still required).
101. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-102(a)(3), 2B-1 13, 2B- 116, 2B- 119 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
102. Id. § 2B-102, at Reporter's Note 34.
103. See id (explaining that the definition of "record" "broadens the traditional ref-
erence to 'writing,' and incorporates electronic records. It does not require permanent
storage or anything beyond temporary recordation. Fixation can be fleeting and percep-
tion can be either directly or indirectly with the aid of a machine.").
104. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998).
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not resolve the question whether, as a matter of copyright law, "an instru-
ment of conveyance or a note or memorandum of the transfer" need be
merely a fixation, or whether the Copyright Act requires a more perma-
nent attestation. Certainly, the recordation provisions of section 205 an-
ticipate more than a temporary fixation, but recordation is not a prerequi-
site to validity of the transfer. So perhaps recordability of the transfer
document is not a prerequisite to validity either. On the other hand, one
might infer from the absence of the words "copy" or "fixed" in section
204(a), that the drafters expected that the signed writing would be in a
medium that was not only tangible, but also persistent.10 To that extent,
Article 2B may be more liberal than the Copyright Act, in which case, the
more stringent standard of the Copyright Act should prevail.
0 6
1. Two Test Cases
To assess Article 2B's potential to promote or to compromise authors'
interests, let us consider two test cases. In the first, the editor of NEW
GREED FINANCIAL NEWS magazine calls Frances Freelance to ask her to
write a 2500-word article on off-shore gambling for the next issue of the
magazine; he tells her NEW GREED will pay her $1500. Frances researches
and writes the article, which she e-mails to NEW GREED with a note: "As
requested, here it is; you owe me $1500." NEW GREED e-mails back to
confirm its receipt of the article and to inform Frances that if she wants her
check to be processed, she must click her assent to an agreement that the
article is a work for hire; or, failing that, a total assignment, or, failing
that, an exclusive license for all print and electronic media.
Article 2B -would not, in fact, cover the first two purported grants,
since these are not "licenses," but rather grants of all informational
rights.' 0 7 Because there is no "signature," there would be no valid transfer
as a matter of copyright law.' 0 8 As for the third term in NEW GREED'S re-
sponse, Article 2B would apply, but would also require an authentication;
the click-on would not of itself suffice. 10 9 If Frances refused to click her
assent, what would be the terms of her agreement? If one refers to the e-
mails, Frances' "record" does not disclose very much detail, apart from
105. The contrast in terminology between § 201(d)(1), which states "the ownership
of copyright may be transferred ... by any means of conveyance" (emphasis supplied),
and section 204(a)'s "instrument of conveyance" does not aid resolution of the question
whether the memorialization of the transfer need be more stable than a temporary fixa-
tion.
106. See U.C.C. § 2B-105, Reporter's Note 5 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
107. See discussion, supra Part II.
108. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West 1998).
109. See U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(3) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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the price term. It would be necessary to refer back to NEW GREED'S phone
call."10 The-terms of the oral communication referred only to publication
of the article in the next issue. Under section 2B-307's approach, one may
argue that non-print media are not "necessary" to the use specified, and
therefore should not be deemed included. Thus, even if Frances, fearing
she would never be paid, did click on her agreement to NEW GREED'S sub-
sequent terms, NEW GREED would in fact only receive a one-time non-
exclusive, non-assignable right to publish her article in the next issue of
the print magazine. In this instance, Article 2B appears to work in the
author's favor.
In the second case, suppose an online bookstore, Hypolita.com, spon-
sors a short story writing contest. The winner will receive fame, fortune,
and hardcopy publication; all participants, whether or not selected as win-
ners, are asked to click assent to the following terms (if they do not assent,
their submission will not be considered):
By participating in this contest, you grant Hypolita and its suc-
cessors the right to use your short story, including, but not lim-
ited to, its characters, as revised or edited by Hypolita in its sole
discretion and under its name, in any medium."
According to section 2B-206, this is a valid release of the authors' "in-
formational rights," not only with respect to the winner, who receives the
consideration of the announced prize, but with respect to the losers, since
section 2B-206 specifies that "a release in whole or in part is effective
without consideration if it is in a record to which the releasing party
agrees, by manifesting assent or otherwise, and Which identifies the infor-
110. Necessary recourse to oral communications to fill in essential terms of the
agreement should not make it vulnerable under 2B-201, since the payment is less than
$5,000, and the duration is less than one year (at least, if one understands the license to
grant only one-time print publication rights). See U.C.C. § 2B-201 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). '
111. As for whether NEW GREED could obtain its objective by sending a check with
language on the back proclaiming that Frances' endorsement constituted an execution of
a work made for hire agreement, or an assignment, or an exclusive license, the copyright
cases are somewhat inconsistent. Compare Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp.,
969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a work for hire agreement must be executed
before the work is completed), with Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 567 (1995), on remand, 960 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that a work for hire agreement may be executed after delivery of the work, so
long as oral agreement on work for hire status preceded the work's creation.) Note that
these standards would not assist NEW GREED, since the work for hire "agreement" was
not proposed, orally or otherwise, until after delivery of the work.
112. This example is inspired by U.C.C. § 2B-206, Reporter's Note 2, Illustration I
(Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
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mational rights released."'"13 What "informational rights" are implicated?
"Use" (assuming that means "reproduction" and "distribution'.'), "re-
vis[ion]" and "edit[ing]" all involve rights under copyright,' ' but since
the "release" grants only non-exclusive rights, it is valid as a matter of
federal copyright law. On the other hand, lack of consideration for the re-
lease also makes it revocable as a matter of copyright law." 15 Because the
copyright norm should override, then, not withstanding their release, the
participants should be able to recall the non-exclusive grant of reproduc-
tion, adaptation, and distribution rights.
State law intellectual property rights may also be at issue here. With
respect to character rights, for example, some ambiguity persists, at least
in the Ninth Circuit, as to whether literary characters are copyrightable."
6
In Warner v. CBS (the "Maltese Falcon" case)," j . the Ninth Circuit sug-
gested that literary characters might not be copyrightable (unless they con-
stituted the "story being told"), and that a transfer of copyright in a novel
therefore would not convey sequel rights in the characters. If character
rights are outside copyright, then, in releasing character rights to Hypolita,
the participants have surrendered control over the characters, and may not
be able to revoke the release. Revocation may not be possible because
section 2B-105 appears to override state-based (as opposed to federally-
based) intellectual property rights. That provision preserves certain state
statutes that conflict with Article 2B, but character rights are not among
them. 18 Indeed, the beneficiaries of these exceptions are not authors, but
consumers.11 9 Thus, even if the Ninth Circuit had found, as a matter of
California law, that a grant of character rights requires consideration sepa-
rate from the consideration for the transfer of copyright, section 2B-206
eliminates the need for consideration for a "release."' 2 This result would
compromise the author's efforts to license the literary work; it suggests
113. U.C.C. § 2B-206(a)(1)(A) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft) (emphasis added). Reporter's
Note I characterizes a "release" as a "form of a license." Id. at Reporter's Note 1.
114. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1)-(3) (West 1998).
115. See, e.g., I.A.E. Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 772, 776 n.10 (7th Cir. 1996);
Avtec-Sys. Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 n.12 (4th Cir. 1994); MacLean Assocs., Inc.
v. Wm. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1991); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 27, §§ 10.01 [C][5], 10.02[B][5].
116. See, e.g., RICHARD WINCOR, THE ART OF CHARACTER LICENSING, 19-25, 238-
48(1996).
117. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
118. See U.C.C. § 2B-105(d) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
119. See id. § 2B-105(d) (explaining that in case of conflict between Article 2B and
state consumer protection measure, the latter prevails).
120. See id § 2B-206(a)(1).
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that state-based rights in the content of copyrighted works (to the extent
any survive copyright preemption) 121 , should benefit from the same over-
rides of Article 2B as copyright.'
2
Other state-based rights that may come within this category are moral
rights to the integrity of the work, and to attribution of authorship.' 23 In
granting Hypolita sole discretion to revise or edit the story, and to dis-
seminate the results under its own name, the participants also are surren-
dering whatever moral rights to the integrity of the work and to attribution
that they may enjoy under state laws. Here again, however, even if a state
law moral rights waiver would require consideration, section 2B-105 may
prevail. 124 It seems, therefore, to the extent that state law may afford
authors additional protections, licensees may too easily avoid their appli-
cation by resort to releases under section 2B-206.
IV. SHOULD ARTICLE 2B COVER INDIVIDUAL AUTHOR-
EXPLOITER CONTRACTS?
If the "fit" between non-software authors and Article 2B is highly im-
perfect, would authors be better off in or out of Article 2B? We have seen
that Article 2B can create anomalous or undesirable situations for authors,
although it can also supply helpful default rules that control when rampant
informality characterizes the author-exploiter relationship. Significantly,
while many potentially affected industries have participated intensively in
the Article 2B drafting process, it appears that authors or their representa-
tives have not closely followed Article 2B's evolution. 12 (If anything, it
may be a surprise to many traditional authors that Article 2B would cover
121. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1998).
122. This result also suggests that this aspect of the "Maltese Falcon" decision, if it
ever was good law, no longer should be.
123. State-based moral rights of integrity may, however, be held preempted under
section 301 of the Copyright Act, on the ground that the moral right to preserve the work
against alteration or distortion is "equivalent" to the exclusive right under copyright to
derivative works. The moral right to attribution, by contrast, has no copyright law ana-
logue, aside from the specific provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the Visual Artist's Rights
Act, which protects only "works of visual art" (physical originals, or limited editions
signed and numbered up to 200, of the art works).
124. See, e.g., JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN ET AL., TRADEMARK AND
UNFAIR COMPETITiON LAW Chapter 9A, "Authors' and Performers' Rights of Attribu-
tion" (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the extent to which section 43(a) of the Lanham Federal
Trademarks Act protects authors' attribution interests). Query whether a 2B-206 "re-
lease" is consistent with that protection.
125. See Interview with Jonathan Tasini, President, the National Writer's Union
(Mar. 6, 1998).
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them.) Yet, if authors are to be covered, it would be best if the drafters
could, with authors' assistance, work through in detail how Article 2B's
provisions would apply, and hoW those provisions might be changed as a
result. (This paper has attempted to raise some issues and questions, but
undoubtedly there are many more instances of concern to traditional
authors whose analysis would instruct Article 2B's drafters.)
If authors (or their representatives) were to participate in the drafting
process (if it is not too late), there may be good reason to maintain Article
2B's coverage. As some commentators have observed or feared, non-
Article 2B contracts may be affected by judicial reasoning by analogy
from Article 2B. 126 If authors are to end up covered by Article 2B through
the back door, maybe it would be better for authors to come in through the
front entrance, and to endeavor to improve the "fit."
How might Article 2B be amended to authors' advantage? For those
copyright-related areas that remain within the purview of state law, such
as the scope of copyright grants and at least certain moral rights, Article
2B could include author-protective rules, for example, a default (if not
mandatory) obligation to credit the author as the creator (or, in the case of
joint works or adaptations, a creator) of the work. Article 2B might also
provide a default rule that the exploiter will disseminate the work as the
author created it, although the parties may specifically contract to permit
the exploiter to modify the work. (Any such agreement should be subject
to the author's "authentication," and not merely to her "assent.")
In some other respects, however, current Article 2B presents too many
"traps for the unwary" author because of the ease with which non-
exclusive rights may be conferred. One possible response to this danger
would be to subject non-exclusive licenses and releases of rights under
copyright to an authentication requirement. Section 2B-206 should also
specify that when the "release" is of informational property rights in
works of authorship, and there has been no consideration, the author is al-
ways free to revoke.
Finally, one might return to the question of Article 2B's scope: should
Article 2B address only licenses, and not assignments, or, most signifi-
cantly, work-for-hire agreements? It may seem anomalous that techniques
that Article 2B would validate for a transfer of an exclusive license would
not also apply to more drastic reductions of the authors' rights. But that
may also be just as well. The November 5, 1996 comments of "the Enter-
126. See, e.g., Letter from Gary L. Griswold, American Intellectual Property Law
Association, to Article 2B Drafting Committee (Nov. 18, 1997), available at
<http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/sycaipla.html#aipla> (visited Nov. 23, 1998).
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tainment Industry" perceived Article 2B as an opportunity to facilitate the
conclusion of work for hire agreements;' 27 Article 2B's drafters have so
far declined the invitation. May they continue to do so.
127. The document can be found on the software industry web site, but appears to
have no credited author. See Article 2B-More than Software (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.2BGuide.com/docs/elposition.pdf>.
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